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Abstract
We analyze risk management trends in electricity commodity markets using the
production and transaction data and written hedging policies of 12 Norwegian hy-
dropower companies. The scope of our analysis is the hedging of physical electricity
production using the power derivatives available at NASDAQ OMX Commodities. In
their hedging policy, these companies either use a Cashflow at Risk (C-FaR) approach
or a hedge ratio approach, or follow no explicitly stated approach. We find that the
derivative cashflows constitute substantial profits for these companies. Furthermore,
hedging contributes to reducing the C-FaR for 10 of the companies. These findings
are surprising considering that we expect hedging to yield zero expected profit and to
smooth the earnings function. Overall, our findings reveal that a practice of incorpo-
rating market views in hedging decisions is widespread in the sample companies, as
both sanctioned in their written hedging policy and as indicated by the substantial
hedging profits.
1 Introduction
As a rule, the liberalization of electricity markets has transferred risk from consumers
to utilities. For example, the risk associated with unfavorable investments was largely
borne by customers through the cost-based pricing model before liberalization. With the
introduction of wholesale markets for electricity, sector risk is shared differently. At NAS-
DAQ OMX Commodities, risk associated with electricity prices can be hedged through
trading of power derivatives. NASDAQ OMX Commodities is currently the largest and
most liquid market, relative to the bilateral over-the-counter (OTC) market, for power
derivatives in Scandinavia (comprising Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland), with an
annual turnover of e74.8 billion and a 57 % market share. For an introduction to this
market, see Lucia and Schwartz (2002). Lucia and Schwartz (2002) in particular empha-
size that Nordic electricity prices are highly volatile, up to an annualized volatility of 189
%. The nonstorability of electricity makes cash-and-carry-based relationships invalid, and
this contributes to the high price volatility found in electricity markets. This aspect, com-
bined with the risk premium found in power derivative prices, is described in Longstaff
and Wang (2004), Kolos and Ronn (2008) and Botterud et al. (2010).
We find evidence of widespread risk management practice in Norwegian electricity
companies. The average annual electricity production in Norway is 123 Terawatt-hours
(TWh1), of which 99 % is hydroelectricity2. Figure 1(a) shows that 90 % of aggregate
∗Corresponding author. E-mail: stein-erik.fleten@iot.ntnu.no. Tel: +47 73591296, fax: +47 73591045.
11 Terawatt-hour (TWh) = 1 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh).
2Statistics Norway (SSB), 2003–07.
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Figure 1: Overview of electricity production and hedging in Norway. Values presented are annual
energy generation in TWh (number of companies). Figure (a) depicts the annual production of
electricity subject to hedging policies (107 TWh) in total annual electricity production, compris-
ing companies producing more than 0.1 TWh. Figure (b) depicts the annual production of the
companies participating in the present study (31 TWh) relative to the total annual production of
all companies contacted during the study.
production is subject to hedging policies3 when including companies with production of at
least 0.1 TWh/a (thereby accounting for 97 % of aggregate production). In other words,
companies that undertake hedging account for close to 90 % of the total generated electric
energy in Norway.
The literature includes numerous studies of hedging practices in nonfinancial com-
panies. We can divide these studies into three distinct categories: (a) case studies of a
particular company, (b) case studies of several companies in the same industry (our chosen
approach) and (c) studies of many (100+) companies. While the first two categories draw
on data extracted from the firms themselves, the final category relies on data from com-
pany financial statements. While the latter has the clear advantage of standardized data
collection from a large pool of companies, Judge (2007) highlight several drawbacks in
the accuracy of the studies using this data source. First, these studies examine derivative
usage generally and not hedging specifically, and therefore ignore hedging methods outside
derivative trading. Second, some of the studies may fail to identify that companies may
actually aim to increase their risk exposure through derivative trading, unlike hedging.
Finally, some studies only use keyword searches to identify hedgers in their samples.
Studies of many companies are performed with data from either financial statements
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002) or surveys (Nance et al., 1993;
Bodnar et al., 1998) or a combination of these two methods (Haushalter, 2000). Triki
(2005) and Judge (2007) review other (c) category studies. The literature on one-company
case studies, which uses data on the same level we have access to, includes Petersen and
Thiagarajan (2000) and Brown (2001).
Literature is scarce regarding empirical studies of hedging in nonfinancial companies
using firm-level data from more than a few companies, and there are no specific study
of hedging practice in the power industry. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is
to examine hedging policies in electricity companies. While we follow comparable case
studies on nonfinancial companies (Petersen and Thiagarajan, 2000; Brown, 2001; Adam
and Fernando, 2006; Brown et al., 2006), and of electricity producers in particular (Fleten
et al., 2002, 2010, 2012), our approach is of a more positive than normative character. We
attempt to describe and analyze how the hedging of commodity production is actually
3A company is assumed to be a hedger when hedging practice or policy is described in its annual report,
on its website, or in an interview in public media.
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undertaken by highlighting policy, the associated financial transactions, and the results.
More specifically, we investigate whether a hedging policy can add value to the firm.
Generally, we shed light into the supply side of the financial part of the Nordic electricity
market.
For this purpose, we acquire data through direct inquiry to 33 Scandinavian hydro-
electricity companies (comprising the 29 largest companies by annual production and 4
others). Twelve Norwegian companies agreed to participate in the study (see Figure 1(b)),
together accounting for 25 % of annual Norwegian electricity production. We collected
data on the production and financial transactions for these 12 companies over a three-
year period (2007–09). The data include some 8,171 unique derivative transactions. This
dataset therefore constitutes unique multicompany data not found in the current risk man-
agement literature. We contribute to the literature mainly through our empirical analysis
of the individual hedging transactions and policies in 12 commodity producers. Analy-
sis of the hedging transactions and statements in the companies’ written policies reveals
that selective hedging practice (incorporation of a market view in hedging decisions) is
widespread among these companies. Most of the companies also have substantial profit
contributions from their hedging transactions and are more successful in decreasing the
Cashflow at Risk (C-FaR) compared with reducing the cashflow variance. This makes us
believe that C-FaR is a more effective metric when evaluating the added value of hedg-
ing. We also find that there is seasonal variation in the proportion of production hedged
depending on the delivery season. However, there is no clear trend as to which season is
hedged more. Together, these findings contradict the neoclassical interpretation of hedging
as a pure risk-reducing method with no expected profit.
Our results show that the normalized hedging ratio for the sample of hydroelectric
producers is comparable with what is found in studies from other markets and countries.
Therefore these results can be applicable to other non-electricity firms. Nevertheless we
expect an influence from the fact that the overall majority of electricity-producing com-
panies in Norway are owned by either the state or by municipalities. This should indicate
that these companies employ a hedging strategy to produce a consistent dividend level for
their owners, who require these funds for public services.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section summarizes
the literature on hedging practice and corporate risk management. Section 2 describes
the dataset. Section 3 provides the characteristics and trends in hedging practice in the
sampled companies. Section 4 analyzes how the hedging of commodity prices can add
value to the same companies. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Literature review
Neoclassical economics postulates that hedging cannot add value because markets are
efficient and because investors can hedge themselves (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Nev-
ertheless, the hedging literature provides both theoretical arguments and some empirical
evidence that hedging, at least to some extent, can be value-adding for the firm.
A common approach to measure added value is through the increase in firm value.
Using a sample of 720 large nonfinancial firms, Allayannis and Weston (2001) conclude
that currency hedging firms have 4.9 % higher value than nonhedging firms. Likewise, Lin
and Chang (2009) discover that airlines resident in the U.S. that hedge their jet fuel costs
increase firm value relative to nonhedgers. Moreover, the results in Lin and Chang (2009)
indicate that fuel price hedging is more valuable during periods of high price volatility.
In contrast, Jin and Jorion (2006) find no evidence that hedging firms are more valuable
than comparable nonhedging firms in a sample of 119 U.S. oil and gas producers. Their
explanation is that the commodity risk of oil and gas producers is so simple to identify
that investors can hedge on their own.
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In another study, 91 % of 350 U.S. nonfinancial firms respond that the most important
objective of their hedging policy is to “manage volatility in cashflow (49 %) or earnings (42
%)” (Bodnar et al., 1996, p. 115). However, while there is little or no empirical evidence in
the literature on whether managing this form of volatility adds value, Brown (2001), using
field study data, does find evidence of income smoothing and reduced cashflow volatility
but does not test for significant reductions in volatility. Confirming this approach, Judge
(2007) argues that volatility analyses must be based on detailed transaction data, as in
Brown (2001), rather than on data gathered from financial reports (which do not report
the gains or losses from individual derivative transactions). An example of this approach
is found in Hentschel and Kothari (2001), who investigate 425 large U.S. firms and arrive
at the conclusion that derivative trading does not result in a significant reduction in stock
price volatility4.
Ederington (1979) argues that companies must balance risk avoidance and the max-
imization of benefits from informational advantage in their hedging policies. However,
belief in one’s own advantages may also result in hedging practices that entail specula-
tive motives. For instance, companies are sometimes found to apply an approach called
‘selective hedging’ where they allow their own market view to influence their hedging prac-
tice (Stulz, 1996). This selective hedging concept is supported by Adam and Fernando
(2006) in separating hedging into two components: predictive hedging, hedging practice
attributable to the fundamentals of the firm and its operations, and selective hedging,
hedging practices related to the firms’ views on price and market movements; i.e., specu-
lation within risk management boundaries. After considering hedging in the gold mining
sector, Adam and Fernando (2006) find clear evidence of a positive return from predictive
hedging while selective hedging has an expected value near zero and a large variance. This
corresponds with the assumption in Stulz (1996) that only the hedging of ’real costs’ is
value-adding for firms, while speculative trading reduces firm value.
Importantly, unformulated policy can contribute to extensive selective hedging. For
example, Brown (2001, p. 413) suggests that “... risk management can be a smoke screen
for speculative trading”. Selective hedging is extensively studied by Brown et al. (2006).
They propose three explanations for the widespread extent of this practice. First, risk
management staff use selective hedging to identify their value creation potential. Second,
historical success from incorporation of one’s own market view in hedging decisions can
encourage managers to extend the practice. Third, the lack of an overriding theory on
optimal hedge ratios effectively allows any hedge ratio to be justified. For instance, a
Wharton-CIBC study (Bodnar et al., 1998) of U.S. nonfinancial firms confirmed the ten-
dency among management to ‘beat the market’, with about 60 % of firms indicating that
they alter either the timing and/or size of their hedges based on market views, while 32
% of firms actively take derivative positions based on their market views.
In the worst-case scenario, selective hedging can lead companies to bankruptcy, as
amply demonstrated by Stulz (1996) in the examples of Metallgesellschaft and Daimler-
Benz. Stulz (1996) further asserts that in many cases, management (by ignoring the
efficient market doctrine) will base their trading strategies on a belief that they are able
to predict market movements. Stulz (1996) then proposes that transformation of the risk
management function into a trading operation is a value-destroying strategy as the firm
purposively undertakes large and unfamiliar risks. Accordingly, management must first
investigate and understand the source of their information advantage before attempting
to act upon it. Reflecting upon their 1994 $100 million derivatives loss, a representative
of Procter and Gamble cited that in retrospect “... we don’t do a lot of hedging because,
if we were smart enough to hedge, there is actually more money to be made in that than
4As our study employs detailed data on spot revenues and hedging transactions, as in Brown (2001),
we are able to undertake suitable volatility analysis and to avoid the pitfalls presented in Judge (2007).
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there is in selling soap”5.
Overall, Adam and Fernando (2006) attribute the value from predictive hedging to the
risk premium. This risk premium has been thoroughly studied in commodity markets,
with Fama and French (1987) identifying a nonzero risk premium in five of 21 commodity
markets. The literature defines this commodity risk premium (Longstaff and Wang, 2004;
Adam and Fernando, 2006) as:
R(t, T ) = Ft(T )− Et[S(T )] (1)
where R(t, T ) is the risk premium, Ft(T ) is the forward price at time t with delivery
at time T and Et[S(T )] is the expected spot price at maturity T. Here, Adam and Fer-
nando (2006) and Botterud et al. (2010) argue that a constant positive (negative) risk
premium will result in the biased hedging behavior of producing firms as they can capture
the premium by increasing (decreasing) their hedge ratio. However, the risk premium
behaves differently for electricity than for other commodities, mainly because its inherent
nonstorability invalidates the usual cash-and-carry relationship. These characteristics are
further discussed in Fleten and Lemming (2003); Botterud et al. (2010); Huisman and
Kilic (2012). In terms of electricity derivative markets, Longstaff and Wang (2004) find
that there are significant risk premia in the short-term forward prices in the Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and Maryland electricity market, confirmed by Kolos and Ronn (2008) in the
same market for long-term forward prices. Using a sample of 11 years of Nord Pool futures
prices6, Botterud et al. (2010) find significant positive risk premia (ranging from 1.3 % to
4.4 %) with increasing premia for longer holding periods (up to six weeks).
2 Data
The data collected and analyzed in this study are from NASDAQ OMX Commodities,
and the participating companies. The price time series consist of hourly spot price data
and daily closing prices for related power derivatives. The company data include data
from 12 Norwegian electricity companies producing at least 0.1 TWh with a total average
production of 30.8 TWh. The period analyzed is January 2007 through December 20097.
The data collected include production and revenue data for this period and data on trans-
actions expiring during this period (8,171 transactions in total). The dataset also consists
of the written hedging policies of 10 of the 12 companies.
Twenty-one of the 33 companies contacted declined to participate in the study. Their
stated reasons for not participating were either a lack of available resources or confiden-
tiality issues. However, a company that has incurred large losses in derivative trading
may wish to keep this information from outsiders to avoid any negative attention. This
could be one reason for companies refusing to participate in the study and could lead to
some sample bias in that only companies that are successful in hedging have participated.
However, after communicating with all of the companies, we are confident that this does
not apply to the majority of the nonparticipating companies. We perceive that these pro-
ducers are quite homogenous with regards to transparency and incentives, and companies
must anyway disclose the (annual) result of their hedging activity in financial reporting.
Companies that engage in both hedging and speculative (‘naked’) trading clearly la-
beled all transactions with the appropriate portfolio, enabling us to separate transactions
for hedging purposes from speculative trades. Each transaction contains information on
5Scott Miller, Director of National Governmental Relations for Procter and Gamble, quoted from the
print version of the Wall Street Journal, April 14th 2001.
6Nord Pool was founded in 1996, though the Norwegian electricity market was liberalized in 1991.
Following an acquisition in December 2007, NASDAQ OMX Commodities now owns the subsidiaries of
Nord Pool. Appendix A provides a description of the power derivatives.
7Owing to data constraints, the period analyzed for two companies is January 2007 through June 2009.
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the type of power derivative, transaction date, delivery period, price area, contract volume,
contract price8 and whether the volume is hedged in the NASDAQ OMX Commodities
market or through some bilateral agreement. The production data describe the time series
of generated electric energy along with the resulting revenue9. Data on planned produc-
tion are scenarios of simulated generation, i.e. planned generation for each month in each
scenario. As shown in Table 1, for companies not using production planning for expo-
sure forecasts, we use either the historical average or minimum production. The hedging
policies for each of the 12 companies are specified in three forms: as a full document (in-
cluding goals, motivation, procedures, restrictions, and chain of command), as a document
specifying hedge ratio boundaries, or no explicit written policy.
We perform the analyses on a monthly basis for the 36 months starting in January
2007 and ending in December 2009. This reflects the architecture of the traded derivatives
(power derivatives represents delivery over a time period and therefore can be split and
aggregated into month-long derivatives) and the level of resolution of the data obtained
from the companies. While some companies apply a rougher resolution (quarterly, yearly,
or even across several years) in their hedging policies, a monthly perspective encapsulates
all possible resolutions. We treat all data from the companies in confidence. For this
reason, we refer to the companies by number. We normalize all absolute values and
present the data in such a way that it is not possible to identify individual companies.
2.1 Abnormal values for Company 11
We give some special attention to the data for Company 11 as a preliminary analysis
indicates some extraordinary values compared with the other companies. This is the
result of three periods where the company unexpectedly shut down a substantial amount
of production capacity. The company is committed to deliver license power, about 10
% of the average production level, to neighboring municipalities and counties (described
further in Section 3.3). During these periods, the license power commitments exceeded
production levels, requiring the company to purchase electricity to fulfill its obligations.
This resulted in negative exposure, providing abnormal results, but we retain the data as
is to ensure that all analyses are consistent and present actual situations.
3 Description of Hedging Practices
3.1 Policies
All companies consider a hedging portfolio of long positions from expected physical produc-
tion and short positions through derivatives. This portfolio is subject to hedging practice,
for most companies described in explicit written hedging policies. Some companies have
policies and restrictions for both hedging and speculative trading practices in the same
document, though separately, but only the hedging policies are within the scope of this
paper. Based on the characteristics of their policies, we divide the participating companies
into four groups (see Table 2).
Groups 3 and 4 differ in terms of the freedom within their hedging policy. For instance,
the hedge ratio requirement is set for Group 3 by a combination of the price level of
three-years-to-maturity swaps and time to maturity, and without a mandate to apply
their own market view in hedging transactions. In contrast, the companies in Group
8Transactions on the exchange are denominated in e, while the analyses are conducted in Norwegian
kroner (NOK). For currency-hedging companies, we use the hedged currency rate for currency conversions,
otherwise the spot currency rate.
9Revenue data are either provided directly by the sample companies or calculated from the production
data using the appropriate area price and assuming zero variable cost (a reasonable approximation with
hydroelectricity production).
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Table 2: Policy group characteristics. The groups are formed through a binary classification tree:
Explicit written policy (YES/NO), hedge ratio approach (YES/NO), hedge ratio target is a range
(YES/NO).
Group Group characteristics Number of companies
1 No written hedging policy 2
2
Does not use a hedge ratio approach, Cashflow
at Risk requirement
2
3
Uses a hedge ratio approach, time-to-maturity
dependent hedge ratio requirement† 1
4
Uses a hedge ratio approach, time-to-maturity
dependent hedge ratio range‡ 7
† a specific target without mandate to deviate.
‡ a range with lower and upper boundaries.
4 allow the market view to influence their hedging decisions, based on belief in their
own market competencies. This is executed through a hedge ratio range defined between
an upper and lower boundary (illustrated in Figure 4 in the Appendix) within which
risk managers are permitted to decide their preferred hedge ratio based on their own
market view. These companies generally consider themselves capable of withstanding
higher volatility from fluctuating hedge ratios (“the corporation is robust enough to [...]
exploit market opportunities down to zero hedging” states Company 9). This is similar to
arguments in Stulz (1996) that a company with a high credit rating (AAA) can afford to
incur large derivative losses without risking default. Hence, they are more likely to engage
in selective hedging given that they have an informational advantage.
Seven companies explicitly state in their policies the goals of their hedging activity. The
more general goals relate to the reduction of the risk associated with physical production.
For instance, Company 6 states that “[the goal is to] secure price levels for the physical
production”, and Company 4 wants to “reduce the risk of the physical production”. Con-
versely, Company 7 and Company 10 have an income smoothing approach as they aim
respectively “[to control the risks associated with] periods of lower income and large fluc-
tuations in the result” and “[to] reduce the fluctuations in profit and cashflow on the long
term”. In this regard, Stulz (1996) asserts that the fundamental goal of hedging should
be to eradicate the extreme lower outcomes of a firm’s earnings function while the upside
is preserved. Company 3 (and Company 12) employ this same argument in their policy
when they state that “the goal [of the hedging practice] is to secure an acceptable income
and hedge as little as possible to retain as much of the upside potential as possible”. Four
companies explicitly state that they aim to maximize the value of their hedging portfolio;
that is, “hedging [...] shall contribute to maximize the company’s revenues within the risk
boundaries” (Company 4), “the goal of the hedging activity is to secure a profit or margin”
(Company 6), “[we shall] maximize the value of the production portfolio—through active
trading management based on market view” (Company 9) and “[hedging shall contribute
to] maximize the profit in the long term” (Company 12). Through interviews, the Group 1
companies communicated that their unwritten hedging policies are founded on “ambitions
to provide stable cashflows” and a “[desire to build a] slightly long portfolio consisting
of physical production and financial transactions”. They also express the view that top
management in their companies dictate their hedging decisions.
Bodnar et al. (1998) reveals that 32% of nonfinancial firms in their sample actively
take positions based on market views. We also find evidence of this practice in our study.
For example, Company 6 has “a portfolio for extraordinary hedging transactions based on
expectations for future electricity prices”, while Company 9 establishes hedging boundaries
such that “it is possible to exploit [their] market competence” based on analysis of the
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available risk capital. Elsewhere, Company 1 and Company 11 communicate that “own
market and exposure views” and “the gut feeling of the superior officers” are important in
their hedging decisions. In contrast, Company 2 emphasizes that their hedging department
“does not have authorization to engage in speculative trading”, and Company 10 states
that “[speculative] trading is beyond the authority of this [hedging policy]”. Overall, the
companies all express the view that they now seek more risk in financial markets than
previously was the case10.
Bilateral contracts carry increased counterparty risk, but because they are OTC deriva-
tives, they do not require the buffer margin that is mandatory at NASDAQ OMX Com-
modities. Four of the companies studied evaluate the possibility of bilateral contracts in
their policies, and two actively use bilateral contracts for hedging purposes. In addition,
three companies use bilateral contracts without including them in their written policy
(Table 3).
The revision cycle of the hedging policies ranges from yearly to not at all during
the period studied. Six of the companies maintained the same policy through the entire
period, while two revised their policy once, one company revised twice, and one company
undertook yearly revisions. Nevertheless, the revisions were of relatively minor scale and
did not alter the fundamental hedging policy of any of the companies. Company 5 is
the only company employing a benchmark indicator for hedging performance, performed
using a theoretical hedge ratio across time. Company 5 modeled this benchmark using
factors like spot price simulations, time to maturity and simulations of future physical
production, and optimized the result to minimize the company’s risk position.
3.2 Transactions
The power derivatives available at the exchange include futures, forwards, European-style
options and Contracts for Difference (CfDs)11, and are denominated in e per Megawatt-
hour (MWh12). One MWh represents the electricity (energy) volume generated from a
source with a power of one Megawatt (MW) operating for one hour. Nord Pool Spot orga-
nizes the day-ahead market for physical exchange of electricity, and, unlike for e.g. PJM in
the eastern U.S. this market is regarded as the spot market. From the day-ahead auction,
Nord Pool Spot calculates a so-called system price, which serves as the underlying average
spot price over the delivery period (Figure 3 in Appendix A illustrates the underlying
price for month swaps). The bilateral OTC market offers equivalent instruments to those
listed at NASDAQ OMX Commodities, along with swing contracts13. The futures and
forwards contracts at the exchange are not in accordance with standard financial termi-
nology. Forward contracts are offered with yearly, quarterly, and monthly delivery, while
futures contracts are available with weekly and daily delivery, representing delivery over
a period and not an instant in time, as would be the case for a storable commodity. Thus
these futures and forwards are equivalent to financial swaps (Benth and Koekebakker,
2008), and for the remainder of this paper, the term swap will be used instead of for-
wards and futures. All power derivatives have a holding period (the time from transaction
to maturity) and a delivery period (all swaps are differentiated by delivery period, with
yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly and daily swaps).
As shown, yearly swaps dominate the traded volume (Table 3), with six of the 12
companies trading more than 50 % in yearly swaps and only two having less than 40 % of
10Revealed during conversations with the companies.
11The underlying price for power derivatives is the system price, while physical generation is sold at
area prices depending on the price area where production resides. The price difference between the system
price and area prices can be hedged with CfDs.
121 Megawatt-hour (MWh) = 1000 kilowatt-hours (kWh).
13The buyer of a swing contract can choose when to purchase the electricity within a set of restrictions,
enabling a flexibility option. Swing contracts are further described by Keppo (2004).
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Table 4: Cumulative volumes hedged with swaps in % of total swap volume. Volume is the sum
of the absolute transaction volumes.
Holding period [months]
Group Company 60 36 24 12 6
1
Company 1 24 % 53 % 54 % 69 % 77 %
Company 11 0 % 47 % 50 % 66 % 77 %
Group mean 12 % 50 % 52 % 68 % 77 %
2
Company 3 8 % 11 % 25 % 44 % 67 %
Company 12 0 % 25 % 60 % 81 % 92 %
Group mean 4 % 18 % 43 % 63 % 80 %
3 Company 4 49 % 54 % 60 % 77 % 91 %
4
Company 2 0 % 20 % 36 % 72 % 93 %
Company 5 0 % 6 % 16 % 42 % 61 %
Company 6 0 % 1 % 11 % 36 % 63 %
Company 7 3 % 14 % 29 % 54 % 70 %
Company 8 0 % 8 % 19 % 33 % 52 %
Company 9 0 % 0 % 3 % 27 % 52 %
Company 10 0 % 0 % 1 % 31 % 66 %
Group mean 0 % 7 % 16 % 42 % 65 %
their total volume of trades in yearly swaps. Furthermore, three of the companies trade
more than 20 % of their total volume in monthly swaps, while the corresponding value
for the remaining companies is 9 % or less. The trade in weekly swaps is only minor.
Five companies also use the bilateral market in addition to NASDAQ OMX Commodities,
while seven companies utilize instruments other than swaps. For instance, options are most
suitable for companies with large uncertainties in expected production as they postpone
the decision to trade the underlying swap until the date of expiry. However, only three
companies utilize these instruments. Likewise, swing contracts enable a flexible load during
the delivery period but are limited to only a handful of trades for Company 3, amounting
to just 2 % of the total swap volume. Only Company 3 trades all types of the derivative
instruments regularly over the period analyzed.
The mean percentage price deviation between the system price and the area prices
(Table 11 in Appendix A) indicates a two-digit percentage difference during Q3 2007,
Q2 and Q3 2008, and September 2009. This price difference is the result of a downtime
in transmission capacity between the price areas. In our correspondence, the companies
expressed the opinion that the CfD market suffers from low liquidity and is therefore not
suitable for hedging the basis risk arising from this price difference. This is also found in
the relatively low level of utilization of CfD derivatives among the companies (Table 3).
Hence, basis risk will influence the accuracy of the hedging policies during periods of high
congestion in the transmission grid.
Swaps constitute the greatest part of the traded volume and are the main hedging
derivative for the companies. Figures for swap volume depending on holding period as
a % of total swap volume are listed in Table 4. Two of the companies, Company 1 and
Company 4, initiated more than 25 % of the swaps with five years or more before maturity,
while Group 4 stands out with lower hedging activity at longer maturities. In evidence,
two years before maturity groups other than Group 4 had entered on average into 52 %
of their total hedge volume, while the corresponding figure for Group 4 is just 16 %.
With the exception of Company 6, Company 7 and Company 10, all companies trade
yearly swaps to build a hedging foundation at long maturities. As maturity approaches,
11
they then employ quarterly, monthly and weekly swaps to fine-tune their hedging ratio.
For instance, Company 1, Company 4 and Company 11 all hedge large parts of their
production with yearly swaps until respectively 50, 55 and 35 months before maturity and
then only trade shorter swaps for the remaining time.
We should put these findings in the perspective of the financial market. Yearly swaps
have a maximum holding period of five years, quarterly swaps two and a half years,
monthly swaps half a year, and weekly swaps six weeks. The availability of long maturity
swaps is therefore effectively restricted to yearly and some quarterly swaps. In contrast,
companies can trade bilateral OTC contracts over far longer maturities.
3.3 Risk Exposure
There are two types of hydroelectric production: run-of-the-river and reservoir. While
the production from a run-of-the-river plant depends on the current flow of the river, a
reservoir plant is controlled and enables the producer to govern outflow. Reservoir plants
therefore have the advantage of scaling down during periods of low prices and scaling up
when prices are high (the aggregate production of the participating companies comprises
21 % run-of-the-river and 79 % reservoir production). This has significant consequences
for risk management. For instance, with this high degree of flexibility, exposure remains
uncertain until actual production begins, mainly because of three phenomena in reservoir
electricity production. First, the ability to store water grants an option to defer production
until periods of higher prices, a practice known as ‘transferring water’ (i.e. through time).
Second, several of the companies in the study have indicated a practice where, for fiscal
periods with lower-than-expected earnings, production is scaled up at the end of the period
to meet profit targets. This is referred to as ‘channel stuffing’ in other industries. Third, in
a situation with very low inflow the reservoir level might become very low, and the producer
might not be able to produce physically the volume sold financially. In this situation the
producer has to revise its hedge ratio according to updated production plans. Together,
these practices interfere with the long-term production plan and make it challenging to
plan the appropriate size of hedging transactions to comply with the restrictions set in
the hedging policy.
Exposure is also subject to the attributes of governmental regulations. First, hydro-
electricity producers are obliged to deliver up to 10 % of physical production at low or no
fee to the local councils where their production plants reside (license power14). Second,
the Norwegian tax code enforces a natural resource tax for hydroelectricity production
alongside the standard corporate tax. The tax is the result of Norwegian regulation poli-
cies to apply additional taxes to the extraction of natural resources. Here, all revenues
from physical production attract both the natural resource tax and corporate tax, while
revenues from financial contracts are only subject to corporate tax. The following cal-
culation of the change in after-tax profit from an increase in the spot price of one unit
illustrates how the natural resource tax affects the hedging decision.
Increase after-tax profit physical production = Decrease after-tax profit financial contracts
1
Spot revenue
− 0.30
Natural resource tax
− 0.28
Corporate tax
= −( x
Derivative cashflow
− 0.28 · x
Corporate tax
) (2)
x = −0.583
14Electricity companies residing in Norway are required to compensate counties and municipalities af-
fected by regulated electricity production because of permanent environmental damage arising from the
production plant and its operation. This compensation consists of a fee and a share (up to 10 %) of
the average physical electricity production, called license power, which is delivered at low tariff or for free.
However, as these calculations do not include exposure to market uncertainty, they are not subject to hedg-
ing considerations. For this reason, we subtract license power from physical production when calculating
risk exposure, and so all production values in the analysis exclude license power.
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Table 5: Forecast error (the mean absolute percentage error) for each exposure forecast method.
The values are averaged over the companies using each method (Table 1).
Method of exposure forecast Forecast horizon [months]
(number of companies) 24 12 9 6 3
Production plan (5) 43 % 52 % 50 % 38 % 33 %
Production plan w/o outlier (4) 22 % 26 % 24 % 22 % 18 %
Historical average production (6) 17 % 17 % 17 % 17 % 17 %
Historical minimum production (1) 14 % 14 % 14 % 14 % 14 %
Assume that x is the net long position in the financial market as a fraction of expected
production that ensures a full hedge; that is, a position where the after-tax profit is
unaffected by changes in the spot price. Then the increase (decrease) in after-tax profit
from physical production following a spot price increase (decrease) must equal the decrease
(increase) in after-tax derivative profit. We also assume that the correlation between the
price and production volume is zero15 (the production level is unaffected by a price change).
If the price per unit increases by one, the revenues per unit from physical production also
increase by one (variable cost is negligible in hydroelectricity production, while fixed costs
are unaffected by a price increase), while the cashflow from a long position increases by
x. Both sides of the equation are reduced by the corporate tax, but the after-tax profit
from the physical production is further reduced by the natural resource tax. Hence, a full
hedge for electricity companies differs from the full hedge for other industries; namely, a
unitary hedge ratio (a hedge ratio of one).
The natural resource tax is 30 %, and the corporate tax is 28 %16. Thus, a fully
hedged position implies that the net long position is −58.3 % of expected production.
Put differently, 58.3 % of expected production must be sold through power derivatives to
reach a fully hedged position. However, only Company 9 explicitly refers to the natural
resource tax operating in Norway and its consequences for the hedge ratio in their policies.
Nonetheless, interviews with some of the companies reveal that they are also familiar with
the consequences of this tax.
Practice among the studied companies is that production planning and hedging op-
erations are performed separately, in accordance with Wallace and Fleten (2002). Three
different methods to forecast the exposure from physical production are utilized in the
studied companies: historical average production, historical minimum production, and
the output from their internal production planning model (used by operators for pro-
duction scheduling). Each company’s method is presented in Table 1. There is a one-
to three-year horizon for production planning. Company 7 uses the historical minimum
production to avoid situations where unexpected downtime in production results in a net
short position in the hedging portfolio (where the volume sold through power derivatives
exceeds the production volume).
The companies’ success in predicting exposure is measured by the forecast error (the
mean absolute percentage error). For the companies utilizing a method based on historic
15The zero correlation between price and production volume is subject to some dispute. A negative
correlation between volume and electricity prices prices lowers the incentives for hedging as this relationship
acts as a natural hedge while the converse is true for a positive correlation (Na¨sa¨kka¨la¨ and Keppo, 2005).
We find that both relationships are plausible. Short-term price increases then give producers the incentive
to increase electricity production from reservoirs to exploit high price levels. On the other hand, price
increases visible at seasonal or annual granularity can be the result of droughts, which results in reduced
production levels. Thus, the long-term relationship between price and the level of production can be
negative. For the purpose of (2), the profit horizon is ambiguous, and it is therefore challenging to
interpret the correct sign of the correlation. Therefore, we believe that a zero correlation gives a reasonable
benchmark for a fully hedged position.
16http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/dok/nouer/2000/nou-2000-18/3/8.html?id=359771.
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Table 6: Tests for difference in mean absolute percentage error between the production plan and
historical average production methods. The test is performed for several different forecast horizons.
Forecast horizon [months] Kruskal-Wallis test statistic p-value p-value w/o outlier
36 0.83 0.361 0.670
24 1.63 0.201 0.394
12 3.33 0.068* 0.136
9 2.70 0.100 0.201
6 1.20 0.273 0.522
3 0.83 0.361 0.670
1 0.83 0.361 0.670
* significant at the 10 % level using a one-tailed test.
production, the forecast error remains the same irrespective of the time to maturity. The
minimum production level method has the smallest forecast error, while the companies
using production plans have the largest average forecast error (Table 5). To test for a
difference in the predictability of the forecasting methods (that is, between the produc-
tion plan and the historical average production), we apply the Kruskal-Wallis test of the
equality of variances to the data17 for the 11 observations over several different times to
maturity (36, 24, 12, 9, 6, and 3 months and 1 month). The p-values are presented in
Table 6.
As shown, there is a significant difference between the forecasting methods at the 10 %
level 12 months before maturity. Thus, a forecasting method based on historic production
levels is better when predicting the exposure level subject to hedging when compared
with a dynamic production planning tool approach. However, this is mainly the result
of the mean absolute percentage error for Company 11, as caused by the extraordinary
months described in Section 2.1 and resulting in extreme forecast errors. Nevertheless, this
reveals the pitfalls of using a production plan for exposure forecasts for hedging decisions.
In contrast, the design of the historical minimum production method minimizes the effects
of such extraordinary periods and thereby avoids net short positions.
We have also tested the sample without Company 11 (referred to as ”...w/o outlier”).
The results reveal that the forecast errors for companies using production plans are closer
to the errors for the methods using time series data. Also, the test for difference between
the production plan and historical average production methods shows no significance at
the 10 % level. The lowest p-value is 0.136 at 12 months forecast horizon. These results
still indicate that the historical average production is more accurate regarding prediction
of exposure than the method of production plans.
We conclude that companies should use different methods for estimation of the risk
exposure subject to hedging (we find a method based on historic production to be the
most accurate) and for maximization of the value of the water in its reservoirs (a dynamic
model is appropriate as hydroelectricity production is quite flexible (Wallace and Fleten,
2002)). Generally speaking, the historical forecasting method yields better predictabil-
ity for hedging operations and less forecasting error when compared with the dynamic
approach.
3.4 Hedge Ratio Characteristics
Detailed production and transaction data allow for the calculation of hedge ratios (the
fraction of production hedged). The following section describes the hedge ratio both
before maturity (as applied by Brown (2001), Adam and Fernando (2006)) and at maturity
(following Brown et al. (2006) and Lin and Chang (2009)). The companies in Groups 3
17Allowing a nonnormal distribution of the small sample size.
14
and 4 apply hedge ratio targets in their hedging policies, and it is possible to measure
their hedging performance by constructing the hedge ratio h.
ht,d,i =
1
E(t, d, i)
∑
τ<t
−C(τ, d, i) (3)
where
C(t, d, i) Short position18initiated at date t with delivery period d for Company i
E(t, d, i) Risk exposure forecast for delivery period d updated at date t for Company i
t Observation date
d Delivery period for swap: {January 2007, . . . , December 2009}
i Company: {Company 1, Company 2,. . . , Company 12}
The hedge ratio comprises three dimensions: the time-series dimension t (relative to
the time to maturity and not the absolute timeline), the cross-sectional dimension d, and
the companies i.
The hedge ratio reflects the NOK increase (decrease) in the hedging portfolio for each
NOK decrease (increase) in the underlying price, while the standard deviation of (3)
measures the consistency in a company’s hedging practice over time. Table 7 presents the
hedge ratio and its standard deviation at different times to maturity.
The time series for the hedge ratio portrays the development of hedging activity as
transactions are undertaken and exposure forecasts revised. Figure 4 in Appendix B plots
the hedge ratios as a function of time to maturity for each company. The detailed values are
in Table 7. All the hedge ratios build up gradually as maturity approaches, consistent with
the policies described in Section 3.1. This ‘staircase formation’ results as the companies
gradually increase their hedge ratio. The plots fluctuate rapidly because the companies
perform hedging transactions as often as several times a month, and even several times
a week. For companies with production plans as their forecast method, fluctuations also
result with any changes.
Because of the presence of the natural resources tax, the hedge ratios for electricity
companies are not directly comparable with the findings in other studies of nonfinancial
companies. However, analogous values can be calculated by normalizing the hedge ratios19:
1.69 (Group 1), 0.90 (Group 2), 0.82 (Group 3) and 0.91 (Group 4), while the mean for
all groups excepting Group 1 is 0.88. This is considerably higher than is found elsewhere
in studies of hedging in nonfinancial companies. For example, Brown (2001) identifies an
average hedge ratio of 0.74 for the currency exposure of HDG Inc. (pseudonym) 3 months
before maturity. Alternatively, Brown et al. (2006) reveals an average hedge ratio of 0.34
among active hedging firms, and Adam and Fernando (2006) calculate hedge ratios of
0.36 two years before maturity and 0.54 one year before maturity for North American
gold miners employing positive hedge ratios. Lastly, for non-U.S. airlines, the average
hedge ratio for jet fuel hedges lies in the interval 0.73–0.83 (Lin and Chang, 2009).
The average hedge ratios at maturity for Groups 2, 3 and 4 are approximately the
same. Group 1 is clearly overhedging their exposure, while the other groups on average
are close to a fully hedged position (0.583 as calculated in Section 3.3).
The companies in Group 3 and 4 have upper and lower hedge ratio boundaries at
specific times to maturity. As an example, Company 2 states that their hedge ratio two
years before maturity should lie between 0.1 and 0.3, while one year before maturity,
the corresponding values are 0.2 and 0.4. Figure 4 reveals that the median hedge ratios
18C is a short transaction as all hedgers will have a net short financial position. As C is preceded by a
negative sign, the hedge ratio h will have a positive sign.
19Hedge ratios are normalized by dividing each hedge ratio by the hedge ratio for a fully hedged position
(0.583). This yields a normalized hedge ratio where a value of one is equivalent to a unitary hedge ratio
for other commodities.
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of Company 5, Company 6, Company 8 and Company 9 lie within their hedge ratio
boundaries, while the median hedge ratios of Company 2, Company 420, Company 7 and
Company 10 do not. Thus, four of the eight companies manage to stay inside their allowed
hedge ratio boundaries. However, the remaining four companies have narrower ranges that
are in accordance with their policy boundaries. Hence, it is challenging to accommodate
policy targets if the boundaries are set too restrictively.
The lower quartile of Company 3 has negative values (Figure 4(c) in Appendix B). That
is, in more than 25 % of months, Company 3 had a negative hedge ratio at this time before
maturity, resulting in a long financial position in addition to their long physical position
from expected spot production. In 2005, early 2006 and parts of 2008, Company 3 took
substantial long positions for all delivery periods, resulting in these negative hedge ratios.
There are several possible reasons for this. First, Company 3 has a C-FaR approach to
hedging and no specific hedge ratio target. This allows selective hedging. Second, during
2005 and 2006, the company revised its policy to scale down hedging activity. From
this perspective, the long positions are transactions aimed at increasing market exposure
according to the new policy. However, during Q1 and Q2 2006, all the hedge ratios in
the time period analyzed were negative, as low as −2.24 for July 2007 per March 2006.
This could be an overreaction to the new policy but is most likely the result of selective
hedging. Generally, the result for Company 3 is surprising. On average, it lies close to
a full hedge and higher than most of the other companies. However, in their policies,
they describe their motivation for hedging as “... [to] secure an acceptable income and
hedge as little as possible to retain as much of the upside potential as possible”. Possible
explanations for its high hedge ratios are then either the belief of positive risk premiums
in the financial market (as found for weekly swaps by Botterud et al. (2010)) or a very
long transition period toward the revised policies (less likely).
Company 11 has a large variability in its monthly hedging practice, but they succeed
in reducing variability six months prior to maturity. We can partly attribute this large
variability to the months including production outages, as described in Section 2.1. As
also shown, six of the seven companies in Group 4 have maximum standard deviations of
less than 0.4.
As shown in Figure 2, the hedge ratios at maturity also appear to follow a seasonal
pattern over the cross section of delivery periods. For instance, the hedge ratios at maturity
for Company 10 are higher during winter than during summer. Adam and Fernando
(2006) identify an equivalent seasonality when analyzing the hedge ratios of gold mining
companies. The varying of market conditions across seasons is one possible rationale for
such behavior. To investigate this, we apply a one-way ANOVA test for equal means (for
normally distributed data) and the Kruskal-Wallis test for equal means (for nonnormally
distributed data)21 to the nine observations for each company. The p-values are included
in Table 8.
As shown, at the 5 % significance level, four of the 12 companies display seasonal
variation in their hedge ratio at maturity, and eight companies at the 10 % significance
level. However, the pattern of the seasonality is somewhat ambiguous in that at the 10 %
significance level, five companies have a higher hedge ratio at maturity during winter (Q1
and Q4), while three companies have higher hedge ratios during summer (Q2 and Q3).
Only Company 8 indicates in its policy (and successfully achieves) a higher hedge ratio
during winter.
In explaining these results, Lucia and Schwartz (2002) find significantly higher spot
price volatility in the Nordic area during summer compared with winter. They attribute
this to lower prices and more supply shocks during summer. Higher volatilities also require
20Even though Company 4 does not have a hedge ratio range, they change their hedge ratio target
subject to the market price using targets for different price scenarios.
21The data are tested for normality using the Jarque-Bera test.
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Figure 2: Hedge ratio at maturity (not normalized) plotted over the cross section of maturities d
for Company 10. We can observe a seasonality effect as the hedge ratio peaks each winter.
Table 8: Test of seasonality in the achieved hedge ratio. ND = normally distributed. Test statistics
are from either the one-way ANOVA test (normally distributed data) or the Kruskal-Wallis test
(nonnormally distributed data). High season is where the hedge ratios are significantly higher,
either winter (Q1 and Q4) or summer (Q2 and Q3).
Group Company ND Test statistic p-value High Season
1
Company 1 Yes 1.76 0.174
Company 11 No 6.34 0.096* Winter
2
Company 3 No 7.71 0.052* Summer
Company 12 Yes 1.82 0.164
3 Company 4 Yes 1.72 0.182
4
Company 2 No 7.33 0.062* Summer
Company 5 Yes 3.71 0.021** Winter
Company 6 Yes 1.37 0.271
Company 7 Yes 7.02 0.001*** Winter
Company 8 No 7.49 0.058* Winter
Company 9 No 15.71 0.001** Summer
Company 10 Yes 12.97 0.000*** Winter
* significant at the 10 % level using a two-tailed test.
** significant at the 5 % level using a two-tailed test.
*** significant at the 1 % level using a two-tailed test.
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higher hedge ratios to achieve same level of predictability, and this can help explain higher
hedge ratios during summer. Another explanation is that the companies in our sample
mainly trade with yearly swaps, which have a fixed power size for all months. As electricity
production in Norway is considerably lower during summer, yearly swaps will then generate
higher hedge ratios during summer than during winter.
However, higher hedge ratios during winter can also be explained by the high uncer-
tainty of production levels during summer22. For instance, Na¨sa¨kka¨la¨ and Keppo (2005,
p. 131) find that producers with “... high load uncertainty postpone their hedging decision
in order to get better load estimates”. Hence, producers with flexible production will be
averse to hedging summer production at long maturities. Considering the low flexibility
of run-of-the-river plants, we would expect that producers with more (less) of this type
of production show less (more) significance in seasonal variation. This is plausible con-
sidering that two of the four companies without significant seasonal variation have 50 %
or more of their production from run-of-the-river plants, while the corresponding value
for seven of the eight companies with seasonal variation is less than 20 % (without any
indication of which season is most hedged). Nonetheless, despite the ambiguity across
seasons in both rationale and result, the findings are surprising and interesting. Most
interestingly, while seasonal hedging behavior is pervasive across the sample, only one
company comments upon the issue in its hedging policy. Selective hedging, of course, also
offers a plausible explanation given the ambiguous pattern as to the season in which the
hedge ratio is higher.
4 Analyses of Added Value from Hedging
Smith and Stulz (1985) present three nonlinear costs that explain hedging motives: tax
convexity, reduced default risk, and stakeholder risk aversion. Several studies already aim
at quantifying the addition in value from hedging these costs (Nance et al., 1993; Fok
et al., 1997; Graham and Rogers, 2002). However, for Norwegian electricity companies,
these costs are less relevant. First, the corporate tax function for Norwegian electricity
companies is linear. This is the result of the imposition of a uniform tax rate and allowances
to carry forward losses to the next year’s budget. Second, because of governmental reg-
ulations, virtually all hydroelectricity companies in Norway are under public ownership
by municipalities, counties and the state. This, along with relatively low variable costs,
results in negligible default risk for hydroelectricity producers. Thus, the only argument
left to motivate hedging is stakeholder risk aversion. Here, publicly owned electricity com-
panies pay out a large part of their profits as dividends, making them important sources
of finance for public authorities. Large reductions in the dividend, even in the short term,
then have large negative effects for owners, translating into high-risk aversion. This level of
risk aversion also affects the behavior of both management and employees. For this reason,
the hedging motive arising from stakeholder risk aversion is considerably more important
than either the convex tax function or default risk motivations. However, it cannot fully
explain the rationale for the hedging practice observed in Norwegian electricity companies.
Added value from hedging is usually measured as increased firm value (Allayannis and
Weston (2001), Jin and Jorion (2006), Lin and Chang (2009)). However, none of the
12 companies in this study is publicly traded, making it unfeasible to perform reliable
22The inflow to hydro reservoirs is fairly stable each year and peaks during the spring season when
the snow melts. The companies must optimize their production such that they do not risk having their
reservoirs overfilled (the reservoir is unable to contain all the water). On the other hand, they do not want
to risk having too little water available for the high winter prices. Given that production capacity during
winter is then dependent on water used for summer production, the projections for summer production
remain highly uncertain while waiting for the projections for winter demand (in close relationship with the
projected temperature level).
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calculations as to whether the market values of the companies are correlated with their
hedging activities. This paper takes a different approach, inspired by Brown (2001),
which focuses on the quantitative information revealed in the companies’ written policies.
Primary attention is given to the derivative cashflows23 (as considered by Adam and
Fernando (2006) and Brown et al. (2006)), price and cashflow volatility (see Ederington
(1979) and Brown (2001)) and C-FaR (see Stein et al. (2001)).
4.1 Derivative cashflows
Company 4, Company 6, Company 9 and Company 10 explicitly state that a goal of their
hedging policy is to maximize the value of the hedging portfolio (the portfolio of expected
production and derivatives). This is not in accordance with the established theoretical
motivations for hedging but can be explained by selective hedging as the companies mo-
tivate this by referring to their own market competence. The derivative cashflows are
calculated as follows for short positions in (4a) swaps, (4b) Contracts for Difference, (4c)
option calls and (4d) option puts (cashflows from swing contracts are calculated as if the
contracts were swaps24).
pis = Q · (fs(t1, d)− p¯system) (4a)
piCfD = Q · [fCfD(t1, d)− (p¯system − p¯area)] (4b)
pic = Q ·max{0, fs(t2, d)− k} (4c)
pip = Q ·max{0, k − fs(t2, d)} (4d)
where
p¯system Monthly average system price [NOK/MWh]
p¯area Monthly average area price [NOK/MWh]
fs(ti, d) Swap price traded at date ti with delivery period d [NOK/MWh]
fCfD(ti, d) CfD price traded at date ti with delivery period d [NOK/MWh]
Q Contract volume [MWh], Q > 0: short position, Q < 0: long position
k Strike price of the option [NOK/MWh]
t1 Date of entering the financial contract
t2 Date of option expiry
d Delivery period for swap: {January 2007, . . . , December 2009}
In addition, the option contracts entail a (5) premium P due at the time the option is
entered into.
P = p ·Q (5)
where
p Option premium per unit [NOK/MWh]
For options, the derivative cashflow is in two parts. The option premium (5) reduces
the cashflow for the month in which the option contract is entered into, while the derivative
cashflow ((4c) and (4d)) affect the month in which the option is exercised. If exercised,
the option transforms into a swap, subject to (4a) at the maturity of the swap.
As shown in Table 9, two of the companies had net negative derivative cashflows from
their hedging transactions. Of the remaining 10 companies, five had positive derivative
23Termed “hedging gains” by Brown et al. (2006).
24This is because we do not have access to information on how the contracts were exercised. We assume
a constant load for the whole period of the swing contract, making them equivalent to swaps.
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Table 9: Total derivative cashflows; values of monthly derivative cashflows as a % of average
monthly spot revenue, averaged over the period analyzed. Cashflows originate from swaps and,
for some companies, other derivatives (Table 3). Maximum and minimum values for the yearly
average derivative cashflows are provided for the evaluation of robustness.
Swaps Other Derivatives Total
Group Company Mean Mean Mean Min Max
1
Company 1 1.4 % 1.4 % −9.1 % 25.0 %
Company 11 −4.9 % 1.9 % −3.0 % −14.8 % 30.7 %
2
Company 3 4.6 % 1.9 % 6.5 % −3.3 % 27.9 %
Company 12 2.9 % −0.3 % 2.6 % −10.0 % 16.4 %
3 Company 4 −8.5 % −0.1 % −8.6 % −22.1 % 11.4 %
4
Company 2 3.4 % 3.4 % −3.2 % 9.3 %
Company 5 15.2 % 15.2 % 2.3 % 31.2 %
Company 6 18.7 % −0.7 % 18.1 % 1.3 % 41.2 %
Company 7 4.0 % 0.1 % 4.1 % 0.1 % 11.3 %
Company 8 12.9 % 0.8 % 13.7 % 4.5 % 22.2 %
Company 9 14.0 % 14.0 % 6.3 % 19.4 %
Company 10 17.8 % 17.8 % 7.3 % 34.8 %
cashflows of less than 10 % of spot revenue, while the corresponding values for the remain-
ing companies are in the range 10–20 %. However, Table 9 indicates large fluctuations
in the payoff from one year to the next. For instance, Company 7 has the smallest gap,
ranging between 0.1 % (2008) and 11.3 % (2009) of spot revenue, while the corresponding
figures for the company with the largest gap (Company 11) are −14.8 % (2008) and 30.7
% (2009). On a whole, Group 1 companies experience higher variation in yearly average
derivative cashflows (the mean difference between the maximum and minimum value is
39.8 % of spot revenue) than companies with written policies (24.6 %). On average, none
of the four companies with an explicit motivation for higher derivative payoffs achieved
a higher cashflow (6.7 % of spot revenue) than the other eight companies (7.4 % of spot
revenue).
Owing to their typically short derivative positions, the derivative cashflows from hedg-
ing transactions for the companies are lower in periods of high spot prices. For example,
in 2008, the average system price in the Nord Pool Spot was 65 % higher than in 2007
and 21 % higher than in 2009. As a result, six of the 12 sampled companies had neg-
ative derivative cashflows from hedging transactions in 2008. Furthermore, three of the
four companies with the highest losses in 2008 had either no hedging strategy (Group 1)
or a hedging strategy based on a fixed hedge ratio requirement (Group 3). Thus, peri-
ods of extraordinarily high spot prices call for a more dynamic strategy that allows the
incorporation of a market view in hedging decisions.
The analysis shows that the derivative cashflows from hedging transactions are mainly
from swaps. As discussed, other power derivatives (CfDs, options and swing contracts),
as described in Table 3, are limited to just six companies25. Of these, Company 3 and
Company 11 respectively accounted for 30 % and 64 % of the total derivative cashflows
from derivatives other than swaps, while the other companies had negligible or no profits
from derivatives other than swaps.
Clearly, there is a substantial profit contribution from hedging transactions by these
companies, ranging above 10 % of spot revenue for five companies (all from Group 4).
While this is a substantial source of profit for these companies, it also indicates extensive se-
25In addition, Company 7 has a single negligible CfD transaction.
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lective hedging, with the warning by Stulz (1996) that this is potentially a value-destroying
strategy if the companies do not fully understand the source of their information advan-
tage and the associated risks. Other work in this area also suggests this sort of behavior.
For example, Adam and Fernando (2006) also find large profits from hedging among 92
gold miners, with a mean derivative cashflow of 10 % of spot revenue. However, Adam
and Fernando (2006) analyze a 10-year period in their study, including two subperiods of
falling prices and one sub-period of rising prices. In contrast, this paper analyzes data over
a three-year period with slightly rising (linear trend) prices (see Figure 3 in Appendix A).
Accordingly, the positive profits are robust for Group 4, and only Company 2 has a year
of negative derivative cashflows.
The mean total derivative cashflows also exhibit some correlation26 with the annual
production levels of the companies (correlation coefficient is 0.33) and the number of trans-
actions (correlation coefficient is 0.72). The strong relationship between derivative cash-
flows and the number of transactions indicates that larger resources allocated to hedging
activities (more transactions require more resources) give a combination of larger capacity
to monitor market changes, and more market competence and access to market informa-
tion. The connection between the latter and selective hedging behavior is strong. That
said, the large positive derivative cashflows could relate to the possible sample bias dis-
cussed in Section 2. However, while the magnitude of the derivative cashflows does not
reject the hypothesis of a biased sample, we find it difficult to believe that more than a
handful of the companies refusing to participate in the study did so because of past large
derivative losses. Nevertheless, we cannot fully put this concern aside.
4.2 Price and cashflow volatility
Company 1, Company 7, Company 10 and Company 11 identify the reduction of cashflow
fluctuations as a motivation for their hedging practice. Here, the reduced volatility of the
hedging portfolio increases the predictability of the companies’ cashflows and adds value
by relaxing stakeholder risk aversion. The volatility in monthly hedging portfolio cashflows
has two components: volatility in physical production volume and prices. While cashflow
constitutes an essential parameter for these companies27, derivatives can only hedge prices.
Hence, both the volatility expected to be reduced by hedging (price volatility) and that is
essential to the companies (cashflow volatility) are analyzed.
The variance of the cashflows and prices with and without hedging28 are used as
measures of volatility. The data (72 observations for each company) are tested for the
equality of variances by applying the two-sample variance test to normally distributed
data and the Brown-Forsythe test to nonnormally distributed data29. The p-values of the
tests are in Table 10.
As shown, only Company 1 and Company 12 achieve a significant reduction in their
monthly cashflow variance at the 10 % significance level. At the 5 % level, Company 1,
Company 2 and Company 3 reduce the variance of monthly average prices, while a 10 %
level adds another two companies. Both Group 2 companies are included among these five
companies.
These results are surprising for several reasons. First, Company 1 stands out as the
only company with a significant variance reduction in both tests at low p-values, though
it does have relatively few hedging transactions (similar to Company 2 and Company 12)
(Table 1). It is notable that Company 1 achieves this without a written hedging policy,
26Correlation is calculated as the correlation coefficient between the total derivative payoff and the
number of transactions for each company.
27For many companies, the yearly dividend is just as important and cashflow is used as a proxy.
28The unhedged cashflow and price are respectively the revenue from spot production and the monthly
average spot prices.
29The data are tested for normality using Jarque-Bera tests.
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even though they describe cashflow stability as an important motivation for hedging.
Second, surprisingly few companies manage to reduce cashflow volatility significantly. This
is at odds with most of the extant studies in Section 1.1 in that they suggest that hedging
should increase the predictability and smoothing of earnings. However, based on our data,
there is little material evidence of any reduction of cashflow variance among electricity
companies from hedging, while the reductions in price variance are more extensive though
not across the entire sample. This is because power derivatives only hedge price risk, not
volume risk, and therefore should (and do) have a greater effect on price variance than
cashflow variance. This is emphasized by Company 3 in stating that their “... policy is
designed to secure price levels, not necessarily the total profit from production. There is
still substantial residual risk associated with uncertainties in production levels”.
We can also explain these results from the perspective of the companies themselves.
The owners of the companies require stable yearly dividends, such that monthly fluctua-
tions matter less as the yearly results determine the dividend. Several companies also have
a quarterly perspective on the hedging portfolio in their policies. For instance, hedging
behavior (Section 3.4), the Nord Pool spot price (Lucia and Schwartz, 2002) and the levels
of production all exhibit seasonal patterns. This contributes to monthly fluctuations in
hedged cashflows, and presumably the variations will smooth out from a yearly perspec-
tive. The basis risk from the difference between system price and area price (Section 3.2)
will also affect the ability of hedging policies to smooth out cashflows. For example, we
identify substantial basis risk during Q3 2007, Q2 and Q3 2008, and September 2009
(Table 11 in Appendix A).
The analysis reveals that only one company, Company 1, of all the companies that
focus on a reduction in volatility, achieves its objective. This result is surprising and
brings attention to the matter of whether volatility reduction is possible alongside the
other goals set in the companies’ hedging policies.
4.3 Cashflow at Risk
Cashflow at Risk (C-FaR) was first introduced by Stein et al. (2001) and suggested as an
alternative to the Value at Risk approach for assessing the risks of periodic cashflows for
nonfinancial companies. In our study, the Group 2 companies employ the C-FaR approach
with one of them explicitly stating that securing an acceptable income while preserving
upside potential is the main purpose of their hedging practice. Company 7 and Company
10 also use this as motivation for their hedging activity. As discussed in Section 3.1, this
corresponds to the proposition in Stulz (1996) that the fundamental goal of hedging is the
elimination of the lowest earnings outcomes.
We apply C-FaR empirically. For each company, we measure the deviation of monthly
cashflow from the average monthly cashflow. We regard the second most negative deviation
as an empirical estimate of the 5.6 % (2/36) C-FaR (6.7 % (
2/30) for Company 1 and
Company 11.). Table 10 presents the results. All but Company 4 (Group 3) and Company
11 (Group 1) achieve a lower empirical C-FaR with hedging than without. The two
companies using the C-FaR approach both manage to achieve a lower empirical C-FaR
with hedging.
The companies achieve a reduced C-FaR on a much greater extent than any reduction in
volatility. However, these two quantities overlap. While volatility reduction measures the
overall income smoothing effect, C-FaR measures the smoothing of lower income levels. C-
FaR is then expected to decrease with hedging because the payoffs from the short financial
position and the income from physical production are negatively correlated. However, for a
majority of the companies, the reduced C-FaR is accompanied by a reduction in the highest
income levels, without necessarily significantly reducing the cashflow volatility. Company
3, by aiming to limit downside earnings while retaining the upside, manages to reduce
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the C-FaR but also reduces the highest income levels. Nevertheless, high stakeholder risk
aversion implies that for these companies, the value reduction arising from extreme low
outcomes is larger in magnitude in absolute terms than the value benefit arising from the
possibility of positive extremes.
In total, the effects of the different strategies on the achieved reduction in cashflow
and price volatility are ambiguous. In general, the companies using a C-FaR approach
achieve both a significant reduction in price volatility and a reduced C-FaR, but for the
other policy characteristic groups, there is no clear trend. For example, one of the two
companies that do not have a written hedging strategy (Company 1) achieves a significant
reduction in cashflow and price volatility (and C-FaR), while the other no-policy company
(Company 11) achieves neither.
5 Conclusion
This paper takes a different approach from the bulk of the empirical risk management
literature. We gather unique transaction data from 12 Norwegian electricity companies.
The main benefit is precise data on company performance. This provides a solid basis
for a fundamental understanding of the characteristics of risk management practices. We
identify four specific groups characterized by attributes of their written hedging policies.
The largest group, Group 4, applies hedge ratio boundaries defined in their policies and
authorizes the use of their own market view in hedging decisions (selective hedging) inside
these boundaries. This approach shows strong results for derivative cashflows, especially
during periods of higher prices, when compared with the approaches that are more static.
We find extensive evidence of selective hedging practices across the sample, as embed-
ded in many of the companies’ written policies and justified by their market competencies
and available risk capital. The majority of companies earn a substantial share of their total
profit from hedging transactions though they do not manage to reduce cashflow volatil-
ity. In theory, we expect hedging to provide the opposite, with zero expected value and
income smoothing. Enhanced appetite for risk among the companies and periods of high
basis risk are possible explanations for the poor results for reduced volatility. The results
indicate that the companies utilize hedging to maximize profit rather than to increase
predictability in cashflows. Companies with written hedging policies (10 of the 12 com-
panies sampled) make a clear distinction between hedging and speculation. Nevertheless,
hedging in electricity companies appears to embody speculative elements.
Both the theoretical literature and the companies agree that a desired result from
hedging is elimination of the extreme lower outcomes of the earnings function. We find
support for this practice both in the written hedging policies and by analyzing C-FaR. The
results indicate that nearly all of the companies manage to decrease their empirical C-FaR
through hedging transactions. Furthermore, compared with the reduction in volatility, C-
FaR is widespread among these companies. The two quantities overlap, but because of risk
aversion among the companies’ stakeholders, we believe that C-FaR is a more appropriate
metric as it accounts for the reduction in downside risk.
We also find that eight of the 12 companies have different hedge ratios depending on
whether they are hedging summer or winter production. However, the pattern is somewhat
ambiguous in that five companies hedge more in winter, and three companies hedge more
in summer. Moreover, with a single exception, this seasonal hedging behavior does not
appear to have sanction in their written policies. We instead find that the practice is the
result of each company’s own market expectations and attribute it to selective hedging.
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Appendix A Institutional and Market Characteristics
For the purpose of this paper there are two markets of interest: the physical spot market
and the financial market. The physical spot market offers trade for day-ahead physical
delivery and prices are determined by daily implicit auctions. The financial market requires
no physical delivery and all the derivatives traded are cash settled. NASDAQ OMX
Commodities offers four derivatives which use the system price of electricity as underlying
price: Futures and Forwards (Swaps), Options and Contracts for Difference.
The Nordic electricity market is divided into several price areas. Within a price area
the spot price is uniform, but it differs between areas. This difference is due to congestions
and different production capacity between the areas. During the auction at Nord Pool
Spot both a system spot price and spot prices for each price area is decided. Producers and
consumers must relate to the price of the area they reside in while the system price serves
as their underlying price for the financial market. Table 11 reveals that there are periods
where the system price deviate substantially from the area prices. This translates into
increased basis risk in the financial market at NASDAQ OMX Commodities. The system
spot price, as well as its linear trend line and the average monthly spot price (underlying
for month swaps) during the analyzed period are plotted in Figure 3.
The derivatives traded on the financial market are either base or peak load contracts.
Base load contracts use the system price for all hours Monday through Sunday, while
peak load contracts use the system price for Monday through Friday (including national
holidays) covering the period 08.00 to 20.00.
A.1 Swaps (Futures and Forwards)
Futures are traded as day and week contracts. Day futures can be traded up to one week
prior to maturity, and week futures are listed with six consecutive contracts. These are
all base load contracts. In addition futures for peak load are offered. The peak load
futures are listed with 5 consecutive week contracts. The settlement of futures consists
of both marked-to-market settlement prior to maturity and the final spot reference cash
settlement after maturity. The marked-to-market settlement prior to maturity is the
change in the market value of the contract (trading profit). Then the final settlement
covers the difference between the final closing price of the future and the system price in
the delivery period (settlement profit).
Forwards are traded as month, quarter and year contracts. For base load forwards
there are six consecutive month contracts, nine consecutive quarter contracts and five
consecutive year contracts. For peak load contracts there are month contracts two months
ahead, quarter contracts three quarters ahead and year contracts one year ahead. In
contrast to futures, the marked-to-market is only accumulated prior to maturity, but not
realized until maturity. The settlement after maturity is, as for futures, covering the
difference between the forward contract price at time of deal and the system price in the
delivery period.
A.2 Contracts for Difference
Due to constraints on transmission capacity within the Nordic grid the price in a specific
area can deviate from the system price. This difference in price is a basis risk for market
participants and can be hedged by Contracts for Difference (CfD). By combining futures
or forwards with CfDs, perfect hedging is possible independent of where the market par-
ticipant is connected to the grid. The settlement of the CfD is based on the difference
between the specific area price and the system price. The market price of a CfD reflects
the market’s prediction of the price difference during the delivery period.
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Figure 3: Plot of daily average spot prices, the linear spot price trend and the average monthly
spot price over the period analyzed. The latter is the underlying price for month swaps. Year and
quarter swaps are cascaded into month swaps and can therefore have the same underlying price.
Week and day swaps have average weekly and daily spot price as underlying price. The plot shows
a slight positive spot price trend during the analyzing period.
A.3 Option Contracts
All option contracts traded on NASDAQ OMX Commodities are European options. The
underlying asset of the options is not the spot price, but the quarter and year forward
contracts. The date of exercise for an option is the third Thursday in the month before
delivery of the underlying contract.
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Table 11: Mean percentage deviation between the Nord Pool Spot system price and the respective
area prices. The values reveal that there were two-digit percentage difference between the system
price and area prices during Q3 2007, Q2 and Q3 2008, and September 2009. This price difference
is caused by downtime in transmission capacity between price areas.
Mean percentage deviation
system price and area price
Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
January 2007 0 % −1 % −1 %
February 2007 3 % −4 % −4 %
March 2007 0 % 0 % 0 %
April 2007 0 % 0 % 0 %
May 2007 2 % −2 % −2 %
June 2007 7 % −8 % −8 %
July 2007 34 % −35 % −35 %
August 2007 68 % −56 % −55 %
September 2007 27 % −8 % −9 %
October 2007 4 % −4 % −2 %
November 2007 −1 % 0 % 0 %
December 2007 −2 % 0 % 2 %
January 2008 1 % −1 % 0 %
February 2008 4 % −6 % −1 %
March 2008 9 % −10 % −6 %
April 2008 27 % −19 % −19 %
May 2008 48 % −52 % −86 %
June 2008 38 % −42 % −38 %
July 2008 15 % −29 % −23 %
August 2008 11 % −18 % −6 %
September 2008 5 % −10 % −2 %
October 2008 5 % −8 % −4 %
November 2008 4 % −4 % −3 %
December 2008 4 % −1 % −1 %
January 2009 1 % 0 % 0 %
February 2009 0 % −1 % −1 %
March 2009 1 % −1 % −1 %
April 2009 2 % −4 % −4 %
May 2009 2 % −4 % −4 %
June 2009 0 % −2 % −1 %
July 2009 1 % 0 % −3 %
August 2009 8 % 2 % 2 %
September 2009 20 % 14 % 14 %
October 2009 5 % 5 % 6 %
November 2009 2 % −1 % −1 %
December 2009 4 % −16 % −16 %
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Appendix B Hedge Ratio Plots
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T
h
es
e
fi
gu
re
s
p
lo
ts
ex
p
re
ss
io
n
(3
)
ag
gr
eg
at
ed
al
on
g
th
e
ti
m
e
se
ri
es
d
im
en
si
o
n
.
T
h
e
v
er
ti
ca
l
a
x
is
—
h
ed
g
e
ra
ti
o
—
is
th
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
(f
o
re
ca
st
ed
)
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
th
at
is
h
ed
ge
d
.
T
h
e
h
or
iz
on
ta
l
ax
is
—
ti
m
e
to
m
at
u
ri
ty
—
is
th
e
re
si
d
u
a
l
ti
m
e
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ea
rs
]
b
ef
o
re
th
e
d
el
iv
er
y
p
er
io
d
st
a
rt
s.
S
in
ce
th
e
p
lo
t
is
a
g
g
re
g
a
te
d
—
3
6
(3
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fo
r
C
om
p
an
y
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an
d
C
om
p
an
y
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)
m
on
th
ly
p
lo
ts
—
th
e
h
or
iz
on
ta
l
a
x
is
is
re
la
ti
v
e
to
th
e
m
a
tu
ri
ty
,
n
o
t
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
ti
m
el
in
e.
T
h
e
th
re
e
li
n
es
a
re
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
th
e
lo
w
er
q
u
ar
ti
le
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5%
q
u
an
ti
le
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ed
ia
n
(5
0%
q
u
an
ti
le
)
an
d
u
p
p
er
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u
a
rt
il
e
(7
5
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u
a
n
ti
le
)
o
f
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
p
lo
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w
h
il
e
th
e
a
re
a
is
th
e
st
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n
d
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rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
m
on
th
ly
p
lo
ts
.
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ra
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g
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s
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th
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lo
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re
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u
e
to
th
e
fr
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en
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f
in
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a
n
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io
n
s
a
n
d
—
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r
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m
e
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m
p
an
ie
s—
u
p
d
at
es
of
th
e
si
m
u
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te
d
fu
tu
re
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
.
U
p
p
er
a
n
d
lo
w
er
b
o
u
n
d
s
fo
r
th
e
h
ed
g
e
ra
ti
o
ra
n
g
e
a
re
a
ls
o
p
ro
v
id
ed
fo
r
co
m
p
a
n
ie
s
in
g
ro
u
p
3
a
n
d
4
.
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h
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e
b
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n
d
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ve
n
in
th
e
co
m
p
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ie
s’
h
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gi
n
g
p
ol
ic
ie
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